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BARRIE AXFORD
Enacting Globalization: Transnational Networks and the
Deterritorialization of Social Relationships in the Global System 
1. Introduction
Bordernization, de-bordernization and re-bordernization are all features of
the contradictory processes of globalization. The boundaries between societies
and cultures, never as firm as much social science supposed, are becoming
inchoate under the impact of new economic flows, mass and specific popula-
tion movements, changes in transportation and communications and, most
germane to this essay, the ubiquity of transnational networks of actors, which
are fast becoming the “new social morphology” of the globalized world
(Castells 1996, 469). The idea of a borderless world constituted of spaces
rather than territories, of “global webs” (Reich, 1991) and “actor-networks”
(Latour, 1993) is a concept that has been appropriated for different purposes
depending on the predilection of the theorist. Recently fashionable accounts
of the boundary – dissolving power of economic transactions (Ohmae, 1990,
1993) rely on the network analogy to demonstrate the functional rationality
carried through regional and global economic flows which, it is argued, are
making territorial jurisdictions and national economies redundant. There is an
implicit neo-functionalist logic on offer in work of this sort, to the effect that
exogenous economic forces will eventually trigger changes in consciousness
and spawn, among other things, global consumers, global managers and global
companies. But in such imaginings actors more often than not are globalized
simply by being there, caught up in the power of global flows, and the social
morphology that results is one of thin and instrumental networks, or else, as
in micro-realist reworkings of the character of world society, denser networks
of transactions and interdependence and relationships dominated by power
and interests (Meyer et al, 1997). When all is said and done, diversity of out-
look is admissable in a world where new forms of spatial practice are now
widely in evidence, and where the deterritorialization of social relationships is
in train, but where old scripts and even older fictions – about fixed identities,
feelings of ontological security, authenticity and, of course, about
territoriality, still abound (Mann, 1996). 
My interest in transnational networks lies not only in the opportunity they
afford to interrogate definitions of political, economic and cultural space, in
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which task students of “postmodern geographies” are now fully engaged
(Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; O’Tuathail, 1998; Luke, 1996, 1998) but in their
ontological status as social actors and as contexts for the transformation of
identities. As part of a modified structurationist perspective on globalization,
which I will elaborate later in the piece, ( see Axford, 1995) I intend to address
the ways in which transnational networks are re-shaping and re-constituting
world society through the possibilities they offer for re-imagining the scale of
social organisation and for re-defining the self-definitions of actors who make
up such networks. A structurationist perspective, albeit one influenced by
arguments from institutionalist analysis (Meyer et al, 1987; Meyer, 1997;
Wendt, 1992, 1994) privileges an understanding of a networked globality in
which actors both construct the world they occupy and are embedded in
chronic structures of meaning and culture. In other words it reflects the messi-
ness and indeterminateness of the global condition, and of all life. As I will
argue, it also has the merit of avoiding the reductionism or the excesses of
some other theoretical positions on globalization whose provenance lies either
in warmed over realism (Jacobson, 1979) or chiliastic postmodernism (Inglis,
1996). 
The concept of “transnational networks” is used here to designate all sorts
of connections between individuals, groups, formal organisations, and move-
ments across national borders (Hannerz, 1996, 6). In this paper I am more
concerned with networks of actors, rather than networks from which human
agency is absent, or only secondary. At its most basic the idea of network
implies nodes and the manner of their interconnection, not centres or periph-
eries, which in itself challenges binary descriptions of world order; while
transnational, played deadpan, suggests only different sorts of traffic across
borders. Both these definitions beg awkward questions, notably about the
“power of flows” between nodes, about criteria for inclusion and exclusion in
networks (Castells, 1996, 469) and about the real charge in the concept of
transnationality (and certainly in the the more loaded “postnationality”)
which is that the connections are not between territorial states, but outside
their remit, and may either directly or implicitly challenge the identities brack-
eted by these jurisdictions. I do not mean to suggest that transnational net-
works have established the global frame of reference as the only meaning
frame for actors , because apart from considerations such as the actual spatial
reach of networks, it is clear that being “constrained to identify” with the
global condition, as Robertson puts it (1992) can take many forms, from
whole-hearted embrace to robust opposition. Football hooligans are globally
connected, and their connectivity aims to subvert or bypass the possibility of
national and international surveillance and regulation, but the loyalty of gang
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members or “firms” is resolutely local or national. Hannerz (1990 and 1996)
following Kroeber (1945) proposes that transnational networks be understood
to constitute a global ecumene of interconnectedness, a convenient expression
for an “interwoven set of happenings” tying the world together in complex
fashion (1945, 9). As will become apparent, I am happy with this designation
because it covers both the spatial reach of networks in various domains and
the key matter of consciousness. However, a global ecumene need not imply
a single world, if by that is meant more than a quantitative change in the scale
and density of social relationships and organisation. In other words it leaves
the key issue of transformations in meaning structures and identity conve-
niently moot, or subject to further empirical investigation. 
Throughout what follows I will develop an argument on the need to see
transnational networks as part of a restructuration of space and as at least a
metaphor for new and often incipient kinds of social organisation and identi-
ties. This in turn allows for a treatment of globalization as a contested and
enacted process. I will begin by looking at interpretations of globalization, and
of networks as features of that process. These interpretations will include
realist assumptions about the ontology of actors, macro-realist arguments
which relegate action to the rim of social explanation, and purely
phenomenological or postmodernist accounts of social action. I will then talk
about bordernisation and de-bordernisation as key facets of globalization and
discuss the utility of the network metaphor as a means of understanding this
dialectic. Then I want to explore the network metaphor more directly,
through a consideration of transnational networks, which can be described as
being either “thick” or “thin,” and which vary as to content, spatial extension
and consciousness (Mann, 1998). Finally I will look at some areas of transna-
tional network practice, drawing upon work being done on the European
Information Society Project as a way of re-imagining European unity; by
discussing examples of what I will call radical connectivity in relation to
cyberscapes and mediascapes, and reflect on the notion of global mutualities,
or a global sub-politics as outlined in Beck’s recent work, and seen too in the
burgeoning literature on transnational social movements. In conclusion, I will
assess the utility of the network metaphor as a way of understanding contem-
porary globalization, and point to some areas where more work needs to be
done.
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2. Theory: Globalization and Transformation
For the various strands of world-systems analysis, the current frisson of
globalization is just one more iteration of a world-historical process that now
wraps the entire world within its geography (Wallerstein, 1997). As a cultural
script territoriality is important only in the sense that the nation-state is the
bounded political actor through which the global division of labour is conve-
niently expressed, inter-nation competitiveness being a functionally required
aspect of world-economic integration. As in other realist accounts, the ontol-
ogy of state and other actors is treated as unproblematic. In a recent paper,
Giovanni Arrighi again argues the case for treating current globalization as
part of evolutionary changes in world capitalism (1997). In his account trans-
formations bruited as unique to current globalizing trends – the information
and communications revolution, the creation of a borderless world in bonds,
currencies and equities, and the sheer ubiquity of “transnational connections”
(Hannerz, 1996) for example in cultural software and political activism, is
interesting only because of its “scale, scope and complexity” (1997, 2). 
Still one-dimensional, but more convinced of the transformative power of
current globalizing forces, are positions which traffic some version of a global
entropic field where all differences between local structures and boundaries
are dissolved, where identities are protean and actors become interchangeable
at some abstract global level (Erikson, 1991; Albrow, 1996; Waters, 1995).
Both polarities are convinced of the power of exogenous and global con-
straints while remaining at odds on the sort of global system that results.
Between these poles subsist a variety of approaches whose stock-in- trade
is a modification of basic realist arguments about the morphology of inter-
national relations (Jacobson, 1979; Keohane, 1986). As I suggested earlier,
some of this is micro-realist in character (Meyer et al, 1997), pointing to ever
denser networks of transactions and interdependence between still autono-
mous territorial states. Neo-liberalism too (Keohane, 1986) though more
catholic in its treatment of international actors, remains enamoured of the
rootedness of collective action in the rational cooperation of territorial (state)
actors. Other arguments, part of a paradigm shift in disciplines such as
Anthroplogy, and convinced of the networked nature of social relations,
depict a world in which remote connections, dispersed networks and hybrid-
ized identities are replacing the older mosaic of separate cultures, societies and
localities to create an ecumene of interconnectedness (Friedman, 1997;
Hannerz, 1996). At the very least, such visions intimate or look to confirm a
radical deterritorialization of social organisation in which processes of global-
ization are redrawing the economic, political and cultural geographies of the
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modern world. At most they suggest a world in which “boundaries, structures
and regularities” (Appadurai, 1996, 46) are nugatory. Much of the work in the
latter categories also bears on the ways in which globalizing forces alter the
frame of social agency as they render traditional boundaries (territorial and
otherwise) and subjectivities ambiguous and possibly unsustainable, except by
dint of retrenchment or through reinvention (Shapiro, 1997, 2). While this is
a facet of what I call the restructuration of territorial imaginaries and identi-
ties, it is also the subject of a fully fledged and often romantic discourse about
the entwinings of the local and the global, about local resistance, and about the
authenticity or otherwise of global cultures. 
Finally there are those positions that traffic right up to and over the edge of
postmodernist deconstructionism. Such work can be found in treatments of an
emergent postmodern geopolitics (Lefebvre, 1974; Luke, 1995; Agnew, 1998;
O’Tuathail, 1998) in which dominant representations of space, or the Euclid-
ean world of “spatial blocs, territorial presence and fixed identities,”
(O’Tuathail, 1998, 6) of binary geographies and rationalistic discourse, gives
way to what O’Tuathail calls post-spatial binaries (as in Benjamin Barber’s
Jihad versus McWorld, 1995) or the space of flows outlined in Appadurai’s
allusive references to global scapes and contingent global subjects (O’Tuathail,
1998; Appadurai, 1990 and 1996). Seductive as these images may be, and I
must confess that I am more than willing to flirt, ideas about postmodern
geopolitics have to be tempered by the recognition that everywhere a growing
number of postmodern characters still perform in resolutely modernist scripts
(Rosenau and Bredemeier, 1994). For all that, my argument will be that global-
ization is contributing to an undoing of the present, where that refers to the
cultural scripts and structural forms and identities of modernity. In particular,
I will argue that transnational networks increasingly populate a global cultural
and political economy where territoriality as the most powerful constitutive
rule is in retreat (Axford and Huggins, 1998). Transnational networks are a
convenient, perhaps even the paradigm expression of the labile and
transformative qualities of the current phase of globalization in which many
social relationships are stretched over ever greater distances and without
regard for the constraints of time. 
Yet pretty much everywhere the space of the networks and flows of the
global continues to subsist with economic, cultural and political architectures
characteristic of territorial spaces and the identities tied to them. So the danger
lies in treating transnational networks as modal phenomena, rather than as just
intimations of what Timothy Luke has called “third nature” (1996), and in
whose functioning Ulrich Beck has already divined a politics based upon
“global mutualities “ (1994, 1996). While the rise of transnational interest
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groups or transnational social movements, such as Greenpeace or Amnesty
International, may be seen as going beyond mere interconnectivity to fashion
both a cognitive and a global moral density, and even to constitute new
solidaries, communal ties and collective frames of reference, a proper social –
scientific caution is necessary. Sidney Tarrow’s recent discussion of transna-
tional collective action (1996) is a pertinent reminder of the pitfalls in conflat-
ing what are actually different forms and generalities of collective action.
Tarrow suggests that what are rather airily discussed as transnational social
movements are often instances of the diffusion of nationally-based collective
action, forms of transnational political exchange between actors fully rooted
in national contexts, or transnational issue networks. Tarrow’s strictures are
helpful in establishing a useful typology of collective action, but less so on
what for me are the key issues of how and with what effects do active agents
(in this case transnational networks as collective actors) engage with institu-
tions and rules of greater generality, to constitute and perhaps transform
themselves and the conditions for their action? To begin to address this ques-
tion, I will now outline a structurationist approach to globalization.
 
 
3. A Structurationist Perspective on Globalization and Transnational
Networks
To reiterate, transnational networks are becoming ubiquitous features of a
globalizing world, although they are not its only expression. At the very least
networks are contributing to a process of growing interconnection and ex-
change between individuals, groups, businesses and movements across bor-
ders. While this gloss is unexceptionable, it is also pretty anodyne. The real
burden attached to the idea of transnational networks as collective actors is
that they are, or can be, coherent discursive entities, even communities, active
in the construction of their own world, where that includes its transformation
as well as its reproduction, rather than being implicated in those processes
simply by being there, or in effect. For example, the activities of human rights
activists in INGOs instantiates a politics of rights not governed by the impera-
tives of national actors (Boli and Thomas, 1997), while through strategic
networking self-consciously “global “ managers interact with each other and
with “environmental” constraints, to imagine “global” companies. Both bear
witness to the reflexive relationships between actors and the conditions of
action. 
From a structurationist perspective agency and structure are mutually
constitutive (Giddens, 1990, 1992). This is not a conflation of agency and
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structure, because while agents engage with structures through reflexive
interaction, structures themselves are often scripts of great social and cultural
power which carry rules, resources and meanings for agents, thereby
contextualising and legitimating their actions. The part played by agency in
the reproduction and transformation of structure can be seen in the ways in
which social institutions(rules) as frameworks for action are initiated, legiti-
mated and diffused by the practice of actors routinely and where there is co-
presence, and through more conscious and even “distanced” interventions, for
example as members of transnational networks. In the global circumstance, the
power of agency to confront rules which are not local in origin or scope may
seem limited, but transnational collective action can expand the sphere of
agency in a world where co-presence is increasingly rare. From the point of
view of the power relationships involved, the key issue is less the spatial scale
of the relationships and more how agents use the available rules and resources
to reproduce themselves and to reproduce or transform contexts which supply
meaning. 
My purpose in offering what might otherwise appear as a highly abstract
schematic for the understanding of how global social relations may be config-
ured, and what part transnational networks play in those configurations, is to
suggest that the scope for effective agency may be enlarged because of the
growing complexity and globalization of modern life. Now, agents are faced
not just by a dominant set of structural properties, largely based on the foun-
dational principle of territoriality, but by intersecting, overlapping and some-
times contradictory sets where institutional scripts – local, national, inter and
supra-national, gender, welfare and so on-cross-cut (Axford, 1995, pp 86-93).
Multiple sources of authority and meaning in the “external” world may be
matched (perhaps through autopoeisis) by internal ambiguity and tension, as
actors variously imagine and enact the global circumstance, informed by
rapidly changing conditions. One of the effects of these changes is to
problematise what constitutes a political sphere or a cultural order and who
are to be allotted roles as legitimate and competent actors in them. Globaliza-
tion has relativized the world and identities in it by penetrating and dissolving
the boundaries of previously closed systems, sometimes of a communal or
ethnic variety, creating inter-societal and supra-territorial discursive spaces
and networks of relationships along the time-space edges of existence. On the
way, various transformations are in train, including reconceptualisations of
existing categories of social stratification, and of key signifiers such as race,
ethnicity, locality, class, gender and sexual preference, along with key associa-
tions such as citizenship and nationality. Is the outcome a rearranged social
space where networked social actors (perhaps only convenient summaries of
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shifting identities) predominate and identities can be constructed out of place
and out of time?
 
4. The Dialectic of Borders and Globalization
Globalization involves variable shifts in the spatial reach and ordering of
networks and the stretching of social relationships across time and space, but
it also involves changes in consciousness, as individual and collective actors
embrace, oppose, or are in some way “constrained to identify” (Roberston,
1992) with the global condition. Borders – to taste and imagination as well as
to the seminal modernist script of territoriality – are being redefined. This at
least is the strong position on globalization; how does it stack up? Histori-
cally, globalizing forces produced global systems which were of limited extent
spatially, and in which the density of social relations established across bor-
ders and time, varied greatly. As we approach the millennium, it is clear that
through various media – the exponential capacity of electronic communica-
tions to compress both time and space, changes in technology which are
allowing production and culture to be divorced from space, capital’s ceaseless
and inventive search for accumulation, the pervasiveness of ideologies on
subjects such as the environment and gender equality, and of course, recent
seismic shifts in the world’s geo-political demeanour – the world is now
thoroughly, if contentiously, globalized.
 The strong position on this undoubted shift in territorial dynamics has it
that territorial borders are becoming increasingly irrelevant to the real flows
and actual patterns of much economic, political and even cultural activity.
Kenichi Ohmae’s vision of a borderless world paints a picture in which the
order of national and societal territories is increasingly moribund and is being
replaced by a glocalized networked cultural economy of production and
consumption (see also Burton, 1997). In a state of the art comment laced with
a dash of polemic on the ways in which information and communications
technologies (ICTs) are bringing about major alterations of social space and in
modes of association, Geroid O’Tuathail counsels that “territoriality is being
eclipsed by telemetricality” (1998, 6). This may be too glib, and I will return to
the ways in which new technologies are altering the frame of social agency and
how they may be rendering traditional territorialities and subjectivities ambig-
uous, drawing upon the limited empirical work to date on this facet of global-
ization. For all this, territoriality remains a durable institution, and seen from
a structurationist perspective, both its obduracy and its fragility are under-
standable.
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Actors reproduce structures through their routine interaction with sets of
institutionalized rules. Constitutive rules such as territoriality, provide power-
ful meaning frameworks for action and for securing identity, validating the
ontological status of actors by providing broad cultural contexts for social
action (Barrett, 1992, but see also Boli and Thomas). So that while it may be
appropriate to describe national sovereignty and territoriality as no more than
“discursive structures” or intersubjective phenomena rather than material
ones, as Wendt notes,worlds defined intersubjectively are not necessarily
malleable, and certainly not as much as they would be in postmodernist dis-
course. At the same time structures have themselves to be reproduced by
actors through both routine and dramatic interventions. Even powerful con-
stitutive rules like territoriality have to be practised in order to remain univer-
sal frameworks for action. Where the identity securing power of structures is
challenged or vitiated through various media: a deterritorialized currency such
as the Euro; by glocal production and global communication flows, and by the
difffusion of global cultural commodities such as Oscar- winning movies, it
becomes less likely that they will be able to suggest to people how they should
live, think and, above all imagine. When actors such as transnational social
movements make conscious and in Giddens’ (1990) sense “distanced” inter-
ventions in, for example, the issue of the human rights record of notionally
sovereign states, or their track record on immigration and refugees, the secure-
ness of terrritorial representations of space and of territorial boundaries
around a status such as citizenship is called into question (Soysal, 1994;
Wiener, 1997). The modern “geo-political imagination,” sold on the
isomorphism of people, culture and territory (Collins, 1990) looks much more
threadbare, and the opportunities to redraw boundaries as legal and cultural
markers between people more bullish.
And yet, while such changes in imagination open up possibilities for new
forms of structuration, they can also serve to intensify homogenisation in
individual and collective constructions of the world. While the autonomy of
local and national boundaries and meaning systems is relativised by a host of
transnational networks – formal and informal, interdiscursive, economic,
religious, democratic – the resilience of the inside-outside dialectic, discussed
by Connolly (1991) and the fear of flying immanent in its removal still vitiates
the possibility of many forms of “radical interdependence” across borders
(Campbell, 1996, and see Slater, 1995).
To a condiderable extent this is a matter of consciousness and affect, rather
than (just) a question of resources. Embracing the networks and flows of the
global is experienced by some actors as a disabling loss of identity and culture.
Hybridised identities, bruited as the hallmark of an interpenetrated world, or
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“habitats of meaning” (Bauman, 1992, 190) which owe more to Sony than soil,
are sometimes taken to defile sacred or civilizational scripts. Even more pro-
saic examples of global fare in the form of meat patties, leisure wear, or Block-
buster rental videos, may be treated as incursions from a globalised culture
that is by definition, protean, depthless and therefore inauthentic, to say
nothing of threatening. Such responses can and sometimes do fortify existing
boundaries, or lead to nostalgia for previous ones,as well as mobilising a
politics fed on such sentiment. On the other hand, as Ohmae says, one of the
features of a borderless world has to be growing consumer indifference to the
national origins of products, except where these carry some sort of cache, or if
the Sunday Times is to be believed, if they are automobiles. (May, 1998). Just
how far French people (as opposed to French cultural elites, or politicians
with an eye for publicity) experience Disney’s Hercules, or Marks and
Spencer’s sandwiches as diminutions of Frenchness, is open to question.
Perhaps less open to question is their continued attachment to the symbols of
French democracy and the particular esprit of French political culture. 
Challenges or perceived challenges to local and national practices, and thus
to the jurisdictional boundaries and cultural walls which isolated and insulated
them, seldom go uncontested. The sort of politics which results can be rela-
tively benign, or more visceral. In Algeria, Islamist opposition to western
secular values and cultural commodities like satellite dishes, not only presents
difficulties for modernising (Westernizing) elites in the form of the quasi-
socialist and military regimes that have ruled there over the past few decades,
but also (and this is another possible dynamic of a globalized world) fuels the
demonology of those who see the flip side of a globalized liberalism as being
a regrettable slide into primitivism and fanaticism (Huntington, 1996; Rodrik,
1997).
 To add to this soup, retrenchment is not, or need not be, just a response to
perceived globalizing threats to territory, identity and culture. The dissolving
of a trans-territorial hegemony in the form of the Soviet world-empire, has
contributed to a pluralization of conflict in which national, regional, ethnic
and civilizational strains are apparent. Ethno-territorial conflicts precipitate an
increase, rather than a decrease in the number of land boundaries and territo-
rial claims which configure the world map, and claims to be acting in the
national interest are still the stock-in-trade of jobbing politicians. At the time
of writing this piece, news bulletins are reporting further fighting in what is
descibed as the breakaway region of Abkhazia in the Russian Federation and
Pakistan’s foreign minister rallies his people in face of world opprobrium at
Islamabad’s tit-for-tat response to India’s testing of nuclear devices, by invok-
ing the mantra of national defence and the protection of contested boundaries.
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So what is the message? In a globalized world borders matter, for how could
we be deceived into thinking anything else in face of the growing commitment
to orthodoxies that celebrate exclusion and nurture dreams of a savage past, or
appeal to the ideal of a closed community against the depradations of any
number of demonised Others or mere strangers? Frontiers too often remain
landscapes of bitter contention; between Arab and Jew, and between Jew and
Jew in the West bank, and between Indian and Pakistani over Kashmir. Only
in the heritage cultures of some post-historical societies has the visceral sym-
bolism of landscapes and nature been educated out of the collective conscious-
ness. The world remains a patchwork of frontiers, often peopled by those
willing to defend them. 
And yet there are significant intimations of a post-territorial world polity.
In Europe, the construction of a non- state citizenship (Wiener, 1997, Soysal,
1995) through EU policy and treaty provisions, proceeds, albeit at a snail-like
pace. There has also been what Sidney Tarrow (1995) calls a marked
“Europeanization” of conflict through the agency of Euro-groups and trans-
national movements, where the locus of conflict and of conflict resolution is
shifted upwards to the Community level. In Italy at the moment, growing
concern with North African immigration is perceived as a European, rather
than an Italian problem, stemming from EU policy interventions that have
turned Europe into a world space. Reactions to this, in Italy and elsewhere in
Europe, range from a willingness to celebrate mobility and hybridity to brut-
ish affirmations of difference. Still within the EU, the scope for forms of
“private interest governance” in the shape of transnational policy networks
and communities is also mightily enhanced through the willingness of corpo-
rate and other associational actors to engage with European institutions as
major allocators of value. How far this engagement Europeanises actors, or
exactly what this means, as opposed to simply altering their behaviour, re-
mains in doubt. 
Transcendance and reaffirmation of boundaries are all part of the dialectic
of globalization. When William Connolly talks about the need to transcend
the borders of democracy through a politics of non-territorial democratization
of global issues (usually the environment, human rights and gender equality,
but also Third World debt and poverty), we can point to the now established
politics of non-state transnational actors whose interventions have at least
problematised thinking about the spaces of democracy and accountablity and,
where human rights are concerned, created a truly global discourse (Boli and
Bennett, 1998). At the same time the continued attraction of what Shapairo
(1998) calls the “Neo-Tocquevillian gaze” – with its penchant for democratic
civil societies organised as territorial states, and with the world beyond these
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enclaves seen as untamed wilderness, liminal and only potenially redeemable
– bears witness to the continued power of the liberal discourse on democracy.
On the wilder shores of reflection the sheer exuberance of claims to discern an
anarchic yet fructive “contragovernmentality” (Luke, 1996, pace Foucault,
1984) amid the spatial re-orderings generated by the collapse of state socialism
and the various “scapes” of dis-organised capitalism (Appdurai, 1990; Lash
and Urry, 1994) is intellectually liberating, once again provided that due
regard is taken of the resilience of “mythic liberal categories, identities and
narratives”. 
Luke’s schema (see 1994, 6 and 7) offers the whole postmodern package
and then some. In a powerful anti-realist diatribe, he argues a profound de-
territorialization of world politics in which new anti-statal, transnational and
extraterritorial social forces proliferate – both sub and supranational in origin
and scope – and where territories “branch into fractal nets”. This is a global
field on which anyone can play, or so it seems, as long as the effect of their
interventions is to undo statist territories and the discourse of territoriality.
Balkan ultra-nationalists, Baltic nationalists, Islamicists, friends of Friends,
virtual communities in cyberspace, in short, anything or anybody which
encourages contragovernmentality and which “rewrights,” yes rewrights,
people as different kinds of denationalized agents are part of the creation of
“neo-world orders” (1995) made up from rearranged glocal space. The upshot
is a more dynamic, more interconnected, more interdependent, yet more
fragmented and certainly more fluid milieu for enacting authority, playing out
roles and managing flows of influence from multiple sources than can be
contained by the Euclidean geometry and identity spaces of territorialized
modernity. As Fritz the Cat once said, “heavy traffic,” but can this sort of
networked globalized world be discerned, if not in full, then in part, and
where?
 
 
5. The Network Metaphor and Transnationalization
Processes of globalization move through the negotiated and often contingent
articulation between local subjects and more encompassing global flows and
structures. The growing complexity of these articulations intimates the possi-
bility of disorder, rather than functional closure, since the connections reveal
new sites for potential conflict and new opportunites for structuration and
transformation. William Robinson (1996,13) certainly no globalization
groupie says that “globalization is redefining all the fundamental reference
points of human society and social analysis,” while Luke has it that “ Moving
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from place to flow, terrains to streams, introduces non-perspectival, anti-
hierarchical and disorganisational elements into traditional spatial/industrial/
national notions of sovereignty” (1995, 127). So notions of the world as a
single place, an ecumene of interconnectedness do not, can not describe a
featureless, anodyne global field; despite, as McGrew, says a sameness in the
“surface appearance of social and political life across the globe” (1992). Rather,
we can discern multiple configurations in a globalized world (Axford, 1999)
which overlap with, but also confront each other. Briefly, these configurations
encompass a world which is little more than a map of variable tastes; one in
which processes of relativization and indigenization are both characteristic
demeanours of actors coming to terms with global pressures; a world in which
whole cultures and identities are becoming “impure and intermingled”
(Rushdie, 1991) and one in which local resistance to global scripts challenges
hybridity and the dissolution of borders. 
Transnationalization is a feature of all these configurations and is expressed
through various kinds of linkages. It is seen particularly in the growing reach
and density of networks and flows-of goods between nations, through migra-
tion, businesss and tourism, (Ash, 1998) as well as in the post- national politics
of INGOs and the cyborg cultures of “organisationless” transnational
coprorations which, through strategic networking, show a “single face” to the
world. Such interconnections globalize the world in a measurable way, but do
so more profoundly because they are redefining the experiences and percep-
tions of more and more actors. Thus, the taxonomic status of a global com-
pany may lie more in its management style and corporate culture than it does
in objective measures of globality, such as the proportion of its operations and
employees abroad. At all events, the global now becomes the cognitive frame
of reference for many actors in many domains, although (as I have suggested
above) it remains much less so in matters of culture and morality. 
The globalized world created out of the intersection and entwining of these
multiple congfigurations is likely to be disordered, chaotic in the sense sug-
gested by Jonathan Friedman (1992, 94, 97). In it ontological certainties are
themselves relativized and as I have argued, constitutive rules, even hegemonic
scripts are increasingly challenged through the transformative capacities of
agency. As a metaphor for such a world, the imagery of transnational net-
works is entirely appropriate. From my structurationist perspective the advan-
tages of network analysis are obvious. For one thing, it affords a more system-
atic picture of the organisation of global social relations than is possible in any
postmodernist account, where only the discursive practices of individual
actors are deemed relevant. In network analysis, both the frames of meaning
used by actors and the circumstances in and on which they act are admissable.
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This admissability involves understanding the reflexive relationships between
the actor and a notionally external world which is both natural and social. I
say “notional” to emphasise the point that actors enact their environments,
but as suggested above, this does not mean that the external world is simply a
mirror of “internal” identity or consciousness, as in autopoietic systems. 
Hannerz says that the global ecumene is a network of networks where
individuals and groups are drawn into “a more globalised existence “ (1992,
47) and the morphology of networks facilitates this shift. In the first place,
networks can be intra and inter as well as trans-organisational, and can cut
across more conventional units of analysis to clarify lnkages which exist
between different personal and institutional domains (Axford, 1995, 78-82).
Most appropriate to the global setting, networks can structure social relation-
ships without constraint of place or the need for co-presence. Much of the
work done by cultural anthropologists addresses the ways in which local and
global social relationships are articulated and either reproduced or trans-
formed by sustained or fleeting encounters. By contrast, in the field of Inter-
national Relations the interest in networks, most pronounced in the study of
international regimes, has stemmed largely from a concern with the problems
of cooperation in a world still governed by the rational anarchy of the interna-
tional system of states. More recent and theoretically impertinent work does
look to explore the ways in which global instabilities are challenging the
bordered world of states, having regard for the burgeoning number of
“postnational mobilizations” (Shapiro and Alker, 1995) that are both the
product of that instability and which subvent it. 
The network perspective draws attention to those increasingly widespread
and diverse forms of transnational mobilization found in networks – of busi-
ness men and women, of exchange students, of pen pals and diasporas – whose
relationships (pace Hannerz) may be either long-distance or involve a mixture
of presence and absence, of coming together and moving apart, of brief en-
counters on the telephone, or extended dialogues, or many-to-many ex-
changes on the Net. The strength of the network metaphor is that it captures
the openness of social relationships which do not involve only economic or
market exchanges, and are not just governed by administrative rules, the
systematic use of power, or the constraints of place. In this it shares some of
the anti-categorical fervour of postmodernist positions. The network idea,
perhaps I should say the network ideal, stresses complementarity and commit-
ment, as well as accommodation between participants, in which the key
“entanglements” are reciprocity and trust (Powell, 1991, 272). This does not
mean that power and conflict are absent from networked relations, which are
unlikely to be pacific. Doreen Massey (1995) cautions the need to be aware of
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the power-geometry present in de-spatialised social relations, and this is a
pertinent reminder that the “organisation of diversity” in the global ecumene,
is often quite brutal, attesting to great asymmetries of power. This noted, the
network metaphor affords insights into a world becoming more integrated,
while acknowledging that the processes of global integration are “more plural-
istic, decentralized and mutable” (Marcus and Fisher, quoted in Hannerz,
1992, 36) than is often assumed. Network analysis portrays a looseness and
diversity which go some way to capture the inchoate character of current
globalization, and offers a glimpse of the diverse contexts through which a
more acute consciousness of the world is occurring for many people. 
The very looseness and inchoateness of the globalized, post-hegemonic
world itself accelerates the dissolution of bounded and autonmous nation-
states and territorial geo-politics. The postmodern feel of this liminal environ-
ment is palpable, as the borders between the domestic and the international
implode, to reveal “configurations of people, place and heritage (which) lose
all sense of isomorphism,” to quote Appadurai (1996, 46). Geography, as
Latour (1997) has opined, now becomes a matter of association and connectiv-
ity, not space. For Latour the globalized world is made up of “actor-net-
works” consisting of collectives of humans, cyborgs and technologies, which
quite confound received wisdom about territories and the subjects and objects
under their dominion. 
This is good knockabout stuff, and useful for its uncompromising embrace
of new ways of imagining global space and new forms of representation. But
in such a world there are only networks and everything else “melts into air,”
to borrow a phrase. Even in Hannerz’s more cautious arguments there is a
sense that considerations of place are often secondary to the transnational
reach of a network, and for some social relationships this has to be true. For
networks of commodity dealers in world markets, place has meaning only to
the extent that local factors impinge on the functioning of the market, through
civil war, change of regime, earthquake or famine. Yet these same dealers may
also enact intense and visceral identities as locals, and in other aspects of their
non-working lives, continue to behave as though “real” culture is fully the
property of particular territories. Networks often carry highly specialist
discourses of a technical variety, and their “thinness” in this respect makes it
hard for some commentators (Smith, 1995) to accept that they can be firm or
authentic contexts for identity formation. In the case of diasporas, whose
raison d’etre is the myth of return to a particular territory, the growing so-
phistication of electronic communications which link members of the dias-
pora, may be no more than a convenient instrumentality. On the other hand,
it might be argued that the ease with which cultures of “real virtuality”
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(Castells, 1996) can be sustained on the Net, as well as by fax and telephone ,
could vitiate the appeal of returning, though the “ingathering” of Jews to
Israel from the former Soviet Republics continues apace. My point here is that
in discussing the relative potency of networks as opposed to places as the
repositories of firm or thick identities, we should not reduce place (localities,
any territories) to a space through which meanings flow, nor should we as-
sume that networks are immanently fragile, perhaps unworkable contexts for
identity formation. Of course, in a thoroughly postmodern world there would
be no solid referential contexts or identities, and no need for them, but the
world is not (or not yet) like that. Even Silvio Berlusconi, prophet of the
networked “videocracy,” was moved to ground his popularity in appeals to
the foundational principles of Italian life, at the same time as his actions as
media mogul were serving to erode what Paul Rabinow has called the “tradi-
tional spaces within a culture” (1993). 
  
 
6. The Network Metaphor: Some Key Issues
In other respects the network metaphor as a means of addressing the
transformative qualities of globalization needs some fine-tuning. Before
turning to an examination of different forms of transnational practice, I want
just to deal briefly with three issues: The first is the question of technological
determinism; the second concerns networks and power, where that refers to
questions of inclusion and exclusion rather than the power of networks as
such; and the third is the matter of where to locate transnational networks in
the morphology of the globalized world.
6.1: Discussion of transnational networks often, and rightly, puts stress on
the space and time devouring capacities of various forms of electronic commu-
nications and associated technologies. It is quite common to find arguments to
the effect that these technologies have, in and of themselves, remade the
“bonds, boundaries and subjectivities of actors, societies and polities, as they
have unfolded across global space” (O’Tuathail, 1998, 6). Castells’s powerful
exegesis of the “network society” is perhaps the most complete statement of
the significance of information technologies in the spread of networks
throughout the entire social structures of bounded societies and beyond
(1996). He argues that networks “constitute the new social morphology of our
societies” (469) making new sorts of spatial practices possible. Being part of a
network is vital to the exercise of power in the information age. Now much of
this is unexceptionable, but, and clearly this is not Castells’s intention, it does
rather smack of determinism. From what I have said above, it is the potential
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for both re-structuration and re-trenchment that resides in globalizing forces
that is its most disturbing and challenging characteristic. In structurationist
terms, new technologies have to be seen as new cultural scripts in relation to
which agents adopt reflexive strategies of accommodation and resistance.
6.2: Networks transcend and may even destroy borders. On the face of it
they might seem like ecumenical forms of social organisation, quite free from
the trammels and divisions that characterise modern imaginaries: universal and
particular; insider and outsider; powerful and powerless; and of course, centre
and periphery. However, it is important to guard against the vision of the
networked world as being bloodless,anodyne and benign. If networks dissolve
certain kinds of boundaries and walls, they inscribe others. Questions of
inclusion and exclusion remain significant, partly because of the uneven distri-
bution of resources and skills available, partly because networks are almost
always specialist discourses, more discriminating of membership/inclusion
than the amorphous social categories they may be replacing. In other respects,
networks may serve to entrench existing inequalities or centre-periphery
relations, or to reproduce them in another form whose spatial reach reflects
existing geo-politics or geo-economics as north-north and south-south net-
works. Research into the use made of computer-mediated communications by
men and women (Herring, 1996) found that “electronic speech” often repli-
cated the sex differences found in face-to-face communication. Castells says
that in the network society, the key power-brokers are always the “switchers”
who connect the nodes of the network, while Doreen Massey (1995, 146-56)
reminds us of the power geometry found in different networks and flows,
often populated by those who are not “in charge”. Migrants and refugees are
not in charge in her usage, while members of an executive club of business
travellers are. An elderly person eating a TV dinner-for-one while watching an
American film on B.SKY. B is just a passive recipient of global fare – a descrip-
tion of the consumer and of the audience which is contestable – whereas
virtual travellers on the Internet are conscious and probably willing partici-
pants in the compression of their own world (Axford, 1997,490).
6.3: Received models of territorial societies and bounded states depict them
as the containers of both thick and thin identities. By “thick” I intend a notion
which is closer to the idea of community (Gemeinschaft), perhaps even of
“habitus,” though without its more brutish overtones. Here the idea of “us”
refers to palpable communites and the jumble of meanings that bind people to
particular places and to the past (Lash and Urry, 1994, 316). Thick identities
constitute a group of people, closing the gaps between them. By “thin” I
imply more apparent instrumentality in relationships and an emphasis on
procedures which open up spaces for and between people as individuals,
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thereby respecting their autonomy. In some measure, but only loosely, this
notion is akin to the established concept of Gesellschaft. Now clearly, what
constitutes a community in a globalized world is open to debate. Referring to
the possibility of transnational cultures, Hannerz (1996, 98) says that the idea
of “transnational communities is not a contradiction in terms,” because what
is personal, primary and has the feeling of intimacy is not always restricted in
space. In other words the spatial reach of networks is, in itself, no barrier to
their “thickness”. Of course one of the problems with conceptualising trans-
national networks as thick in the sense used here, is that thick cultures are seen
as providing the basis for a cohesive, and probably exclusive form of commu-
nity, while thin constructs seem to owe more to the observance of a common
set or rules or protocols, which overlay or disguise more elemental attach-
ments. Thick communities have the feel of wholeness, they are overarching
and primary, while thin networks are partial, convenient, secondary or ephem-
eral, except in postmodern discourses where the distinction is meaningless. To
some extent this imagery demonstrates the continued power of the territorial
narrative and the continued appeal of “real” places. Like Monty Python, we all
know implicitly what we mean when we say that the extension of social
relationships across space and across borders is likely to produce only thin
networks of capital, production, communication, INGOs and epistemic
communities. In this imagination, firm or thick cultures are found in localities,
in bounded nations, in ethnies, in tribes and in criminal gangs. Where excep-
tions are made, as in the case of cults and diasporas, it is because they are
vivified by transcendent and all-subsuming spirituality, by love of particular
places, and occasionally, as in the case of some transnational social move-
ments, by ideology or some powerful expressive motivation which augments
mere connection. Imagery apart, it seems to me that the de-centring of the
nation-state and of territorial identities still has to be addressed through the
growing spatial reach of transnational networks, the increasing density of their
actions and interactions in different domains, and the changing consciousness
of networked actors. At this point in the contested transformation of
territoriality, the thickness or thinness of their ontologies is perhaps less
crucial than the fact that their appearance is discommoding to this order,
though their character remains crucial to the sort of world that is emerging.
 
 
7. Transnational Networks in Practice
In the final section of the paper I want to look at different forms of transna-
tional network practice in different domains. I will do this by examining i)
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recent work on transnational networks and movements, which either adopts
a world society problematic, or else is located as part of a discussion of the
“geographies of resistance” (Pile and Keith, 1997), ii) by discussing some
forms of what I call radical connectivity, applied both to virtual networks and
to those which now routinely use information and communcations technol-
ogy to compress the world, and iii) through a consideration of different ways
of conceptualising European unity in the spaces and flows of the European
Information Society. 
7.1: Transnational networks are part of the changing logic of collective
action in the globalized world (Cerny, 1995), but the “radical interdepen-
dence” across borders that they exemplify and foster (Campbell, 1996, 96) is
nowhere near modal, although it is increasingly dense and visible. As Michael
Mann says (1998, 187) however we choose to define transnational networks,
there has been a huge increase in the shift away from local networks of inter-
action, to the national, the international and the transnational, and of course to
the global. One index of this development is the growth of international non-
governmental organisations (INGOs) over the last one hundred years or so.
As part of a study to demonstrate the roles played by INGOs in shaping
world culture and impacting upon states and inter-statist organisations, Boli
and Bennett (1997) chart the increase in active cross-border organisations from
a base of 200 at the turn of the century to 800 in 1930, to 4000 in 1980. Their
argument is part of a strong case for transnationality, tempered by the recogni-
tion that territorial states and their offshoots still exercise great power in the
world polity. In this hybrid world INGOs as transnational actors in areas like
population policy, the environment, the status and role of women and techni-
cal standardization, “employ limited resources to make rules, set standards,
propagate principles and broadly represent “humanity” vis-a-vis states and
other actors” (1997, 172). Related evidence on the impact of transnational
INGO activity on the policies of national states can be found in Jakobsen’s
account of the way in which transnational dynamics affected the policy of
Brazil and India on climate change (1997). In like vein, Mato (1996) seeks to
reveal the manner in which transnational networks, and what he terms other
“global agents” have been instrumental in the reconstruction of civil societies
in Latin America. 
On a more cautious note, Sidney Tarrow (1996) is agnostic on the question
of whether a transnational civil society is being constructed out of the many
cases of diffusion, political exchange, issue networks and social movements, all
spawn of the globalization of the world economy and the greater density of
transnational ties (1996, 14). He is aware that notionally objective conditions
– economic and geo-political flux – are not enough in themselves to trigger
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collective action, just as a sense of common identity or a more diffuse aware-
ness of shared interests may not be sufficient to produce action. Questions of
transaction costs and other resource considerations are also critical in turning
potential into actual mobilization. Tarrow acknowledges that there are impor-
tant forms of transnational collective action, but insists that most of what is
defined as transnational collective action, or more narrowly as transnational
social movements are not actually cases of unified movements which cross
national boundaries at all, but forms of action which, on the face of it, are
more in keeping with the world as it is, being largely national or international
in scope and character. This is quite a powerful critique, but in key respects
misses the point, which lies less in the taxonomic status of networked actors,
and more in the kind of politics which their existence opens up, and the chal-
lenges they pose to the script of nationality and national definitions of value,
even where their remit may be thoroughly local and their actions confined to
particular places. Terrains of resistance, as Paul Routledge says, comprise a
“multiplicity of possibilities and movements” (1996, 526) and can refer to any
site where contestation between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic powers
and discourses takes place (1996, 516).
In all this activity there is not and probably never can be any uniformity of
purpose or organisational style. Local resistors meet with their transnational
counterparts only on the site of contestation that is the territory and the
representational forms of the nation-state, or maybe in opposition to the
ideology and practices of global neo-liberalism or unaccountable government.
Even where they consciously challenge globalization, they are often impli-
cated in it, and, as Castells says (1997, 70) are themselves “symptoms of our
societies,” impacting upon social structures and cultures with variable intensi-
ties and outcomes. Which view is not too distanced from the more assertive
and up-beat formulation offered by Ulrich Beck in his discussion of the “sub-
politics” of an emerging cosmopolitan world society (1996). Like Castells,
Beck argues that transnational networks are symptoms of the current disorder,
which in his case is the advent of a global “risk society”. Beck insists that the
contingent qualities of the world risk society promote intense reflexivity and
open up the prospects for a cosmopolitan society made up of “global
mutualities,” cooperative global institutions and forms of “sub-politics” which
give shape to what he calls the “world public”. Sub-politics constitutes a form
of globalization from below in that its appearance through new transnational
actors, such as Greenpeace, establishes a politics which is outside and beyond
the representative institutions of the political system of nation-states (1996,
18). Critically, he suggests that “sub-politics sets politics free by changing the
rules and boundaries of the political” (1996, 18). In all these accounts of trans-
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national networks, the importance of information and communications tech-
nologies (ICTs) is seen as critical.
7.2: The key role of ICTs in at least facilitating the formation and work of
transnational networks is acknowledged widely. Castells writes that new
technologies are critical to the survival of social movements, especially where
they are oppositional. Referring to the “Zapatistas” in Mexico, he opines that
without the aid of fax, Internet and alternative media they might have re-
mained an isolated and localized guerrilla force (1997, 107). In an aside to a
more thorough-going examination of transnational migrant communities and
the nation-state, John Rex muses that “ethnicity today often operates by e-
mail” (Rex, 1998, 73). But aside from their obvious instrumental uses in pro-
moting “long-distance nationalism” (Anderson, 1993) and other, seemingly
more respectable kinds of social movement, there is often some reluctance to
treat with networks actually constituted by electronic communications as
authentic, despite the fact that they must be a expression of a globalized world
par excellence. In this respect Tarrow’s sentiments are typical. He worries lest
the growing web of virtual networks – e-mail conferences; gossip-swaps and
so on – are proving so seductive in terms of their ability to reduce transaction
costs and afford “visibility” that they blind participants to the real social costs
incurred. These are that such networks do not, indeed can not deliver the same
“crystallization of mutual trust and collective identity” (1996, 14), the same
thickness, as the interpersonal ties seen for example among the founders of
nineteenth century socialism or Islamic fundamentalism. Here once again is a
clear rehearsal of the points I raised above. Electronic networks are by defini-
tion, inauthentic, incapable of being either subject or context. These senti-
ments echo the debate about the impact of media cultures on the stock of
social capital in the United States (Puttnam, 1995) and are part of a neo-
Tocquevillian romanticism about the propriety of certain political forms and
practices relative to others. Part of the problem with countering these claims
is that there is dearth of empirical evidence on the construction and function-
ing of electronic networks. Prescription and perhaps hyperbole abound.
Appadurai (1996) waxes lyrical about the profusion of “diasporic public
spheres” effected through the mediascapes and technoscapes of a
deterritorializing globality, but we know little about the actual working of
these, because the more lumpen reality is that to date there is a lack of the kind
of ethnographic studies of electronic networks which are now commonplace
for other transnational communities and transnational networks (see Basch,
1994; but see the proposals under the UK/s ESRC Programme on Transna-
tional Communities). And yet “global communications spaces” (Schlesinger,
1992) as well as Appadurai’s mediascapes are obvious sites for the examination
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of communities entirely reliant upon electronic mediation, even if this has to
be conceptualised as the study of diverse audiences. Mediascapes offer large
and complex repertoires of images, narratives and ethnoscapes for audiences
throughout the world (Uncapher, 1994). As sharers in a mediated culture,
these audiences “experience themselves as a complicated and interconnected
repertoire of print, celluloid, electronic screens and billboards” (Uncapher,
1994, 21). Too slick? Possibly, but most assuredly these developments bear
strongly on questions of meaning and identity. But when the opportunity
arises for the creation of new transnational, borderless environments in
cyberspace, the convention is that by far the most durable are those which
allow people to interact in a shared place where they can feel secure. The
attempt to construct actor-networks which are more than “thread-like, wiry
and stringy” to quote Latour (1997) and to analogise properties of the “real –
world” – from bills of rights to the virtual mansion as a meeting place – dem-
onstrates just how strong our older fictions are.
7.3: In the European Union many of the issues that I have raised here are
being played out in the most audacious experiment in regional integration seen
in the modern world. Current interest in the integrative process centres on
whether the EU is to be understood as some kind of superstate, an exercise in
advanced intergovernmentalism, or, as is now fashionable, sui generis, a
unique, multi-level polity and exemplar of the “new governance” (for a sum-
mary of these positions, see Hix, 1998). In the new Europe of the 1990’s all
sorts of boundaries are being redefined (Axford and Huggins, 1998), partly by
dint of the liberal ideology of deregulation which has driven the Single Market
process, partly because of the collapse of state socialism, and also through the
space and time devouring capacities of electronic communications. Along with
global markets, digital technologies are attenuating the territorial state’s claims
to autonomy and its status as the sole locus and guarantor of the “imagined
community of the nation”. For all this, confusion over the way to conceptual-
ise the EU polity, the official version of constructing Europe owes much to a
“conceptual grid” (Caporaso, 1996) which converts what are really questions
about transnational governance into the niceties of territorial government,
thereby suggesting that uniting Europe is, or can be, a process akin to that of
nation-building. But the EU does not fit easily into any accepted category of
government, and its lack of legitimacy among national populations in member
states makes it difficult to conceive of it as an imagined community. To con-
solidate the integration process, the Commission has given prominence to the
idea of a European identity as a key building block in the integration process
(Laffan, 1996). But the “inarticulate major premises” (Ruggie, 1992) governing
the ideals of territorial rule and ways of legitimating it culturally, seem at odds
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with the more postmodern concept of Europe as “space of flows,” which
Ruggie also puts forward, and which is the rationale of the internal market
process (though not of Maastricht). Now to some extent, the EU has already
addressed the fact that the idea of “a” Europe is in reality only a pot-pourri of
local, regional, national, ethnic and even global identity claims. So pluralism of
sorts is already part of its wish-list for a viable “united” Europe. 
If Europe is a space of flows, even a loosely articulated multi-level polity,
then it is possible to imagine Europe as a network polity and civil society, as
a space created and reproduced through transnational, regional and local
networks of interaction – cultural, commercial, scientific, military and educa-
tional – rather than, or as well as a territory to be governed or regulated in the
usual sense of these terms. This is clearly Castells’s intention in his discussion
of the network state in Europe, (1997b) and it informs Michael Mann’s insis-
tence (1998, 205) that “Euro” is an ecumene of interaction networks, com-
posed of multiple, overlapping and intersecting networks: of specialists,
Euromanagers, Socrates exchange students and so on. However, as I have
suggested, this mildly postmodern interpretation runs up against the imagin-
ing of those seeking European cultural integration and a European identity.
These conflicting visions of Europe collide in the policy space of the European
Information Society Project (ISPO). 
Overall the idea of a European Information Society offers a general pre-
scription for a virtual Europe made up of transnational networks (Bangemann
1994; High Level Group of Experts, 1997; Bangemann, 1997). At the same
time, it is influenced by two strands of thinking about culture as an integrative
force and about the role of ICTs as the chosen means of cultural production
and delivery. The first strand interprets culture as a discourse which tran-
scends national societies and expresses a genuinely European heritage. In this
strand, ICTs are integral in mapping a post-national cultural space, which not
only affects the ways in which people interact with each other across borders,
but also changes their perceptions through the representation of existing
culture, through the ways in which cultural goods are produced and dissemi-
nated, and thus through the ability of people to understand the traditions and
cultures of the past. ICTs are thus the gateway to the representation of a new
European cultural metanarrative. 
By contrast, the second strand emphasises the role of ICTs in reviving local
cultures, or the cultural survival of spatial communities of various kinds. Here
the EU is mindful of the “space annihilating nature” of information technolo-
gies, while it also holds out the prospect of new non-spatial “communities of
interest,” that is, specialist discourses, which presumably subist in (rather than
transcend) the wrack of local cultures and fit alongside the transcendental
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discourse of European culture. Leaving aside the functionalist use of culture
on offer in Euro policy statements, this collision of different imaginings of
Europe looks quite fruitful and properly inchoate, though it results in a good
deal of policy confusion. The increasing reliance on transnational networks
and communities of interest to initiate and deliver programmes under the
ISPO remit represents a significant institutional innovation and a re-imagining
of policy space. In addition it problematises what is meant by community.
Both Mann and Anthony Smith (1998; 1995) wish to distinguish any form of
European network identity or symbolic community from national sentiments
which are embedded in communities of ritual and emotion. Smith goes so far
as to argue that it is impossible to create an authentic European identity in the
absence of real European signifiers, but in the absence of much hard evidence
it is wiser to be less dogmatic. My structurationist, and mildly postmodern
position is that the networks and flows of the European information society,
open up new possibilities for the articulation of spatial and virtual communi-
ties and new ways of imagining European unity.
 
 
8. Conclusion 
The role of transnational networks, both thick and thin, in remaking the
world’s social, political and cultural geographies is widely acknowledged, but
in key areas pertaining to their formation and functioning, and in relation to
their ontologies as collective actors, much empirical research still has to be
done. To adapt William Connolly (1991) the radical changes which we usually
refer to as globalization are still falling through the gaps between disciplines
with different rules and agendas. My argument here has been that a modified
structurationist approach to the ways in which these “new” actors both repro-
duce and transform the conditions for action will yield important insights,
despite the claims that structurationism is difficult to use in empirical investi-
gation. As to the thesis that transnational networks are contributing to a
radical deterritorialization of social relationships and identities, the evidence is
mixed, some of it confirming the thesis, the rest pointing to the continued
vitality of states as actors and particular places as the repository of firm identi-
ties and traditions. This is not, or not yet a borderless world, but how could it
be otherwise? As my brief discussion of the European case suggests, the world
being made through the multiple intesections of and sometimes the conflicts
between transnational networks, which stretch social relationships; and be-
tween them and other versions of social organisation which traffic ideas about
world order still rooted in terrritory (sometimes super-territories) and tradi-
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tion. For all this I do not subscribe to the view that transnational networks are
by defintion “thin,” if by that is meant in some way inauthentic, or incapable
of sustaining identities. To argue thus, without the benefit of detailed empiri-
cal investigation is the worst kind of a-priori reasoning. In the case of Euro-
pean unity, study of transnational networks can reveal a rather different vision
of that process and of the outcome than is possible in either inter-
governmentalist or conventionally integrationist positions. It trades on the
recogniton that transnational networks and communities of affect and interest
ought to be understood as what Featherstone (1990) calls “third cutures,”
which all afford opportunities for new allegiances and identities, but (and this
is significant) without the necessary concomitant of the destruction of older
ones, because (where ISPO is concerned) of their location in the hyperspace
and cyberspace of European flows. This picture of a hybridized European
ecumene in a globalized world seems to me to reflect curent circumstances,
and may be paradigmatic. Transnational networks are re-ordering the world
“from below” as it were, and we should beware of responding to this either
through reflex hand-wringing about the world we are losing, or ritual hand-
clapping about the joys to come. 
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